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I. INTRODUCTION
Growing recognition of the policy-making function of the judiciary
has led to an explosion of judicial behavior studies aimed at exploring
the socio-economic and psychological influences on decision-making in
the courts. Although sketchy evidence is available that methods of
judicial selection are related to the characteristics of the judges selected,1
few empirical studies have been made of the politics of judicial selection
at the state level. The organized bar is conducting a concerted campaign
for adoption of a selection method which institutionalizes bar partici-
pation in the selection process. Its goal is to "eliminate politics" from
judicial selection, and to provide "better judges." Yet the legal profes-
sion has not furnished a definition of the politics it seeks to eliminate, nor
the criteria by which better judges can be measured. "Competence" is
often discussed by members of the organized bar as a criterion for selec-
tion, but no empirical evidence is provided that technical proficiency of
appellate judges varies with the means by which they are selected. The
criterion of competence would appear to be more relevant to the level
of trial courts in state and municipal systems, where extractive politics of-
ten appear to control judicial output, but bar plans for reform usually
exclude the lower courts. The debate contrasting present with preferred
methods of selection is conducted in a factual vacuum; both reformers
and defenders of the status quo operate in the realm of speculation.
This investigation of the selection of Ohio appellate judges in the
decade from 1960 to 1970 was undertaken first to develop a conceptual
framework for evaluation of judicial selection methods, and second to test
the conventional wisdom about judicial elections in the cauldron of actual
events.
II. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Building a conceptual framework for evaluating judicial selection
methods should start with the simple question, "What do judges do?"
The obvious and simple answer is that they decide cases. The conse-
quences of their decisions, however, are neither obvious nor simple.
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record her gratitude to Sheldon Gawiser and Paul Woelfl, S.J. of John Carroll University for
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I Jacob, The Effect of Institutional Differences in the Recruitment Process: The Case of
State Judges, 13 J. PUB. L. 104, 106 (1964).
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The judges are actually "doing" far more than settling individual disputes.
Particularly at the appellate level, where difficult and ambiguous cases are
decided,2 judges are shaping and developing the law as it will be applied
to individuals and groups in the future; they are allocating societal values
such as life, liberty, wealth, and representation in other kinds of decision-
making; they are, in other words, making policy. The custom of judicial
review emphasizes the policy-making function involved. Since demo-
cratic theory suggests that policy makers should be in some way accounta-
ble to the people they rule, accountability becomes a criterion by which to
measure selection methods.
Judges are, however, policy makers of a special sort, restricted by the
concept of judicial role. Externally, judicial discretion is limited by pub-
lic expectations that the actions of the courts are "law-oriented," that is,
based on objective principles. Internally, judicial discretion is limited by
the socialization process of legal training which teaches potential judges
that they ought to be guided by impartial principles.3 Becker makes a
useful distinction between the impartiality and the independence required
of a judge:
[A]s the judge is dependent upon the law (bound to interpret and apply
it), he is impartial; as he would resist those in other positions (or those
who support them) who would have him violate this dependency, he
is independent.4
Since impartiality is a mode of behavior made possible by the indepen-
dence of judges, independence becomes the second criterion by which
means of judicial selection should be measured.
It is clear, then, that judicial decision-making as a special kind of
policy output creates a systemic problem. Inevitably the conflict be-
tween judicial norms and political reality produces a state of tension be-
tween independence and responsiveness. In fact, for the judiciary to ful-
fill its complex function, it may be necessary to maintain this state of
tension. Hence, the central question about methods of judicial selection
is not, "How do we take the courts out of politics," but what method of
judicial selectioni best accommodates the delicate balance between account-
ability and independence?
Since appellate judges, deciding cases in the same legal-institutional
framework, with access to the same body of legal precedent, according to
2Useful discussion of the differential impact on society of trial and appellate courts may be
found in K. DOLBEARE, TRIAL COURTS AND URBAN POLITICS 82, 124 (1967); and L.
MAYERS, The Courts as Molders of the Law, THE A.ERIRCAN LEGAL SYSTEM 338-51 (rev. ed.
1964).
3 Professional norms also emphasize special restrictions on judicial role. The American
Bar Association Canons of Judicial Ethics prohibit judges from engaging in political activity,
and forbid revealing opinions about a case before the decision is announced. ABA CANONS
OF JUDIcIAL ETHICS Nos. 28 and 30.
4T. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS 145 (1970).
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the same rules of the collegial game, can and often do arrive at conflict-
ing decisions, the student of judicial selection is compelled to ask if there
are ways of predicting judicial propensities. Are there characteristics
of personality, social background, or political affiliation of potential judges
that would enable those who staff the bench to influence the outputs of the
courts ?
The search for the wellsprings of judicial behavior has been underway
at least since the publication of Cardozo's Nature of the judicial Process.,
The attempt to identify the influence of personality factors on judges'
opinions has yielded unsatisfactory results.' Few propositions are testable
by means available to students of the problem, since judges are under-
standably reluctant to submit to psychoanalysis.7 Interviewing judges as
an alternative method of investigating personality factors8 is limited by
the kinds of conclusions that can be drawn from the responses. The
judge's personality is filtered through his own perceptions and his will-
ingness to make revelations to curious investigators. If a judge is una-
ware of a given attitude, or if he is aware of it and it conflicts with judi-
cial norms so that he is unable or unwilling to admit that it is related to
his decision-making, interviewing cannot reach important influences on
behavior.
Scattered findings about the use of social background factors as pre-
dictors of judicial behavior have also yielded somewhat limited results.
Investigators in this area recognize the inferential quality of conclusions,
and do not assert a cause and effect relationship between background
factors and judicial voting behavior.' Attempts to identify the decisional
propensities of judges by their socio-economic, religious and ethnic identity
have led to conflicting assertions in various judicial settings. 10
5 B. CARDOZO, Tz-E NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). See also the simple but
heuristic model of judicial behavior in Haines, General Observatiops on the Effects of Personal,
Political, and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. RE . 96, 116 (1922).
6 Glendon Schubert claims to have demonstrated the influence of a personality factor which
he calls "pragmatism-dogmatism"' in judicial decision-makin& G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL
MIND 259 (1965). For a critical discussion of his conclusions, see Shapiro, Political Jurispru-
dence, 52 KY. L. J. 294, 329 (1964).
7Jerome Frank discusses this problem in J. FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
See also J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949) for the recommendation that judges be psycho-
analyzed before being permitted to take on judicial duties. David J. Danelski has analyzed chief
justices of the United States according to the personality types identified by Karen Homey
(compliant, aggressive and detached), but the findings relate more to the process of leadership
in a particular small group than to judicial opinion formation. Danelski, Conflict and Its Res-
olution it the Supreme Court, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 71 (1967).
8 Becker, A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial Role
Variations, 60 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 677 (1966).
9 Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions: Notes for a Theory, 29 J. POL.
334 (1967). The first major work in this area was J. SCMIMHAUSER, THE SUPRPIE COURT:
ITS POLITICS, PERSONALITIES AND PROCEDURES (1960). See also Heiberg, Social Back-
grounds of the Minnesota Supreme Court Justices: 1858-1968, 53 MINN. L REv. 901 (1969).
10 Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Court of Appeals, 1961-1964, 60 AM.
POL. ScI. RV.v. 374, 382 (1966); Nagel, Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial Propensities, 24 J. POL.
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The one variable which has turned up significant findings in a number
of different judicial situations is political party affiliation.'1 A crude
but useful measure, the Republican or Democratic party label appears to
have an "organizing quality," to be an "effective 'net result' of many
judges' hierarchies of values.' 2 Party appears to be a significant predictor
of behavior on economic issues by federal courts of appeals judges,'
and on many types of cases decided in the highest state courts. Stuart
Nagel analyzed a national sample of decisions in state supreme courts
and found that Democratic judges tended to favor 1) the defense in crim-
inal cases, 2) the administrative agency in business regulation cases, 3)
the claimant in unemployment compensation cases, 4) a finding of consti-
tutional violation in criminal-constitutional cases, 5) the government in
tax cases, 6) the tenant in landlord-tenant cases, 7) the consumer in sales-
of-goods cases, 8) the injured party in motor vehicle accident cases,
and 9) the employee in employee injury cases. Republican judges tended
to favor the opposing party.' 4 Nagel does not suggest that the party af-
filiation detenmines the vote of the judge in a particular case, but that
personal values lead a judge both to his party affiliation and to his de-
cisional propensities. However, party affiliation may have an indirect ef-
fect as "a feedback reinforcement on his value system" which in turn
affects decision-making.' 5 In their decisional propensities, judges appear
to resemble their fellow-partisans in the public at-large, in Congress,
and in the executive.
92 (1962); Nagel, Testing Relations Between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-
Making, 15 WEST. POL. Q. 425 (1962).
1 1 An exception to this generalization must be made for the United States Supreme Court, for
reasons related to its special institutional norms. See J. Schmidhauser, supra note 9.
12 S. Goldman, Politics, Judges and the Administration of Justice 267 (1965) (unpublished
Ph.D. disseration, Harvard University), quoted in Grossman, supra note 9, at 346. A recent
cross-national study of elite attitudes found that ".... background factors with the widest scope
.. were again associated ... with adult socialization experiences-especially occupation and
party affiliation." L. Edinger & D. Searing, Sopial Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodologi-
cal Inquiry, 61 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 428, 436 (1967).
13 Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964, 60 AM.
ScL ReV. 428, 436 (1967).
14 Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. PoL. SCd. REV. 843, 845
(1961); see also Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CrM. L C. & P. S.
333 (1962).
Confirmation of these findings may be found in studies of economic decision-making on the
Michigan Supreme Court, G. ScHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
129-42 (1959) and Ulmer, The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court, 11
J. PUB. L 352, 352-62 (1962); and decision-making on reapportionment questions, Barber,
Partisan Values in the Lower Courts: Reapportionment in Ohio, and Michigan, 20 CAsE W.
REs. L. REV. 401, 406 (1969). But see critical analysis of the work of Nagel, Schubert and
Ulman in Goldman, supra note 13; Howard, On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 62 AM. POL.
Sa. REV. 43 (1968); and Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges' Voting, 63 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 57, 59 (1969). Adamany replicated the Michigan studies of Schubert and Ulmer in Wis-
consin and found that differences in selection procedures, political culture and judicial process
accounted for his divergent results. Id. at 62-72.
15 Nagle, Political Party Affliliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 843, 847
(1961).
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To put together a winning coalition for elections, both major parties
attempt to appeal to the broad middle of American politics; hence the
parties often appear to converge in ideology. However, they differ in
important ways on issue-dusters, and the differences reflect contrasting
value systems. Empirical research has shown that Republican leaders tend
to identify with "business, free enterprise, and economic conservatism
in general," and to oppose extension of social welfare and equalitarian
measures, while Democrats are more responsive "toward labor and toward
government regulation of the economy," and are more willing to use
legislative means to improve the status of disadvantaged groups.16
Party followers tend to share the values of their respective leaders,
although their views may be less intense, less informed, and less consis-
tently opposed.17  That followers still perceive and respond to these dif-
ferences in partisan values may be seen in survey data from the 1970
congressional election. High-income voters supported Republican candi-
dates by a nearly 2-1 margin, while low-income voters supported Demo-
crats 3-1. Middle-income white collar and blue collar workers gave Demo-
crats majority support but by lesser margins than the low-income voters."
Since judicial nomination in the states is achieved largely through par-
tisan activity, it should not be surprising that judges would tend to share
the cognitive orientations of party activists. 9 Nagel summarized the de-
16 McClosky, Hoffman & O'Hara, Issue Conflict and Consensus Ainoung Party Leaders and
Followers, 54 AM. POL. Scd. REV. 406, 415-16 (1960). McClosky, et al., found that ". .. the
disagreements are remarkably consistent, a function not of chance but of systematic points of
view, whereby the responses to any one of the issues could reasonably have been predicted from
knowledge of the responses to other issues." Id. at 410. McClosky's study, based on a
sample of major party convention delegates and a national cross-section of the population, was
replicated by Thomas A. Flinn and Frederick M. Wirt with a sample of Ohio Republican and
Democratic party county chairmen, and secretaries of county, central and executive committees.
Flinn and Wirt found that in Ohio, "[oin national and state issues the inter-party differences
are striking." Flinn & Wirt, Local Party Leaders: Groups of Like Minded Men, 9 MIDWEsT
J. POL. Sci. 77, 80 (1965). Attitude structures of the leaders of the two parties were more
similar to each other on civil liberties questions than on economic issues, id. at 85, a finding
confirmed in an attitude study of federal appeals judges by Sheldon Goldman, supra note 13,
at 381. See also J. TURNER, PARTY AND CONSTTUENCY: PRESSURES ON CONGRESS 60-66
(1951).
17 McClosky et al., supra, note 16 at 426.
18 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, CURRENT AMERICAN GoVERNMENT 22 (1971). Parti-
san preferences of voters in a national cross-section of preincts in November 1970 showed the
following cleavages:
Income over Income under Middle Income- Blue
$15,000 $5,000 White Collar Collar
Rep. 65% 25% 42% 31%
Dem. 35 75 58 69
These data confirm the persistence of voter preferences shown in the classic survey research
A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER 122,147
(1960).
19 For example, for many years after the adoption of the direct primary in Ohio, 103 Ohio
Laws 476 (1913), judicial candidates along with other candidates for public office were re-
quired to furnish five vouchers for "partisan integrity," and to make the following oath:
[Vol. 32.
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cisional propensities of Republican state supreme court judges as exhibit-
ing "the viewpoint associated with the interests of the upper or dominant
groups and with resistance to long-range social change;" and those of
Democratic judges as reflecting "the viewpoint associated with interests
of lower or less privileged economic or social groups in .. .society and
(to a less extent) with acceptance of long-range social change."2
Recognition of these complex political realities about judicial de-
cision-making requires us to reject the most common analytical dichotomy
regarding judicial selection: appointment, the method used in the original
states as a continuation of colonial practice, is contrasted with popular
election, an alternative which swept the country in the middle of the
nineteenth century as a component of Jacksonian democracy. Appointive
states are then sorted out by simple appointment, with confirmation by
another body such as the state senate, and some variation of the Missouri
Plan (also known as the Nonpartisan Court Plan or the Merit Plan);
while elective states are sorted out by partisan and nonpartisan ballot.
This dichotomy ignores the central political features of all four types
of selection. Partisan election and simple executive appointment are
"visible" methods of selection, which enable the relevant public (those
who are interested in the work of the courts) to see, know, or understand
how judges are selected, and therefore to hold the judges (or those who
select them) accountable for their activities if they wish to do so. Non-
partisan election and the Missouri Plan are invisible methods of selection,
which confuse or keep in ignorance the relevant public, so that neither
direct nor indirect accountability of judges is possible. 1 By this classifi-
cation, both the present selection method used in Ohio (nonpartisan
election) and the method preferred by bar association activists (Missouri
Plan) are invisible.
III. THE CAULDRON OF ACTUAL EVENTS
Ohio's elective judiciary was established by the constitution of 1851
in response to the popular perception that the courts, staffed by the leg-
"I am a member of the ----------------- party and intend to vote for a ma-
jority of the candidates of such party at the coming election.
... I will support and abide by the principles enumerated by the
party in its national platform and in its platform in the state adopted during the present
year," 106 Ohio Laws 547 (1915).
The present declaration of candidacy required of entrants in the primaries for judicial of-
fice as well as for other offices includes swearing to membership in the party, and the following
statement:
"I further declare that, if elected to said office or position, I will qualify therefor,
and that I will support and abide by the principles enunciated by the-----------
Party in its national and state platforms." OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3513.07 (Page
Supp. 1970).
20 Nagel, supra note 14, at 846.
21 A fifth method of judicial selection is omitted from this analysis: legislative election, a
method used by four states; a special case, partaking of both visible and invisible characteristics.
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islature, had become "undemocratic," because party service had become
the indispensable qualification to win a judgeship. 22 To restore the courts
to the people, the new constitution provided for nomination of judges
in party conventions and election by partisan ballot. By the end of the
century the state courts were again viewed as captives of the parties, and
structural changes were sought to make them more democratic. Equating
"more democratic" with elimination of partisan politics from governing
processes, Progressive forces in Ohio secured the passage of the Nonparti-
san Judiciary Act of 1911,23 which required nonpartisan ballots for the
election of judges, and rotation of judicial candidates' names on the
ballot. The following year, the Progressive majority in Ohio's constitu-
tional convention succeeded in proposal and ratification of direct primary
nomination of all elected officers, including judges except those nominated
by petition.14  Like the structural changes which preceded them, parti-
san primary nomination and the nonpartisan election ballot were soon
subjected to severe criticism. It was widely noted that "ability to get pub-
licity rather than judicial fitness" had become the pathway to the Ohio
bench.25 The cycle of growing dissatisfaction with the quality of the
judiciary, and impetus for reform was repeated, this time culminating
in the 1938 electoral defeat of a constitutional amendment to substitute
the appointive-elective method of selection which was to earn its name
two years later by adoption in Missouri.26 The 1938 campaign for struc-
tural change, like those before and after, was conducted in the absence of
empirical data about voter behavior or candidate characteristics.
A. Judicial Appointees in an Elective System
One of the most common assumptions about elective judiciaries is that
the "normal" means of access to the bench is gubernatorial appointment
to fill an unexpired term, followed by election which is virtually automatic
due to the appointee's advantage of incumbency. 7  In a cross-state in-
vestigation of elective state 'supreme courts from 1948 to 1957, Herndon
found that 56 per cent of all judges on these courts were initially appointed.
However, this single statistic obscures important difference. The propor-
tion of appointments in individual states ranged from 12.5 per cent in
Alabama to 100 per cent in Maryland, South Dakota and Wyoming. s
22 Aumann, The Selection, Tenure, Retirement and Compensation of judges in Ohio, 5
U. CIN. L. REV. 408, 409 (1931).
2 3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.04 (Page 1960).
24 OHio CONST. art. v, § 7.
2 Aumnann, supra note 22, at 414.
26 Clark, ProrCommentary on Proposal for Selection and Tenure of Judges, 30 OHIO B.
ASS'N REP. 916, 920-21 (1957).
2 7 Herndon, Appointment as a Means of Initial Accession to Elective State Courts of Last
Resort, 38 N. DAIc I. REv. 60, 67 (1962).
28 Id. at 63.
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When the elective states were classified as partisan, semi-partisan and non-
partisan, Herndon found that appointment increased as a means of initial
access as the method decreased in degree of partisanship.29 The less
partisan the means of selection, the more likely was initial access to the
bench obtained by gubernatorial appointment, according to Herndon.
In Ohio, both historical and recent data show that the so-called "nor-
mal" pattern has not prevailed, and Ohio's "semi-partisan" method of
selection does not bear out the hypothesis. To fit the hypothetical pat-
tern, about half of Ohio's appellate judges should reach the bench by
appointment. Actually, only 19.9 per cent of the accessions to the Ohio
supreme court from 1852 through 1970 were by appointment.30 The
proportion of supreme court appointments in the past decade has been
somewhat higher (29.6 per cent), but in the state's appellate judiciary as
a whole, only 18.2 per cent of the accessions from 1960 through 1970
were by appointment. 31
The further assumption that judicial appointees, running as incum-
bents, are subsequently elected more or less automatically by the voters
is also invalid in Ohio. In the entire history of the elective supreme court
(1852-1970), a majority of the appointees who stood for election for the
remainder of the term were defeated by the voters. In the past decade
(1960-1970), a slight tendency toward electoral endorsement of such ap-
pointees has developed, but a significantly partisan pattern of voter
response is clear in both the historical and the contemporary data. Ap-
pointees of Democratic governors have tended to be defeated by the elec-
torate, while those named by Republican governors are most likely to
have been subsequently elected.' Since no appellate judicial appoint-
29 
"Semi-partisan" refers to a judicial system which combines partisan nomination of judges
with nonpartisan election, as in Ohio. The other three states with semi-partisan judiciaries
are Arizona, Maryland and Michgan. Id. at 67.
30 This percentage measures 38 of the total 191 accessions. Tabulated from Ohio Secre-
tary of State, Official Roster of Federal, State, County Officers 106-12 (1970); T. Brown, Secre-
tary of State, Ohio Election Statistics 1969-70, 133 (1971).
3 1 Omo APPELLATE JUDGES, BY MEANS OF ACCESSION, 1960-70.
TABLE 1
ELECTED APPOINTED TOTAL
Supreme Court 19 8 27
Courts of Appeals 89 16 105
Total Number 108 24 132
Per Cent 81.8% 18.2% 100%
T. Brown, Secretary of State, Ohio Election Statistics 1959-60, passim (1961); Id. 1961-62
(1963); Id. 1963-64 (1965); Id. 1965-66 (1967); Id. 1967-68 (1969); Id. 1960-70 (1971).
John W. Peck was appointed in 1959, but is included in this analysis because he ran for election
for the unexpired term in 1960. Robert B. Leach, appointed to the supreme court September
24, 1970, will not face the electorate until November 1972.
32 Between 1852 and 1970, 15 of the 29 supreme court appointees who stood for election
were defeated. Twelve of the 14 appointed by Democratic governors were defeated; only three
of the 15 appointed by Republican governors suffered this fate. There is a statistically significant
relationship between the party of the appointing governor and the likelihood of his appointee's
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ments have been made across party lines in Ohio since 1953, 83 this means,
at least in recent years, defeat of Democratic and election of Republican
judicial appointees at the polls.
Relatively wide swings in voter response to the gubernatorial candi-
dates do not explain the partisan pattern of voting in Ohio that appears
to favor Republican appointees on the bench. What Herndon defines as
a "gross shift" in partisan control of the gubernatorial office (when the
winning party turns out the incumbent governor's party by capturing
more than 55 per cent of the statewide two-party vote for governor) 3
occurred twice in the past decade in Ohio. In 1962, the Republican party
captured the governor's chair with 58.9 per cent of the two-party vote;
simultaneously, the only appellate judicial appointee running for election
in Ohio that year-a Democrat-was defeated.2 5  However, the "gross
shift" to the Democrats in 1970 by 55.5 per cent of the two-party vote
was not accompanied by a similar defeat of Republican appointees to the
bench. In fact, seven appellate judicial appointees were running in 1970;
all were Republican, and all were elected.2 6 Hence it is clear that wide
swings in partisan sentiment in Ohio do not necessarily determine judi-
cial ballot outcomes.
This brief examination of the extent of appointive access to Ohio's
elective judiciary, and the tabulation of the electoral fate of judicial ap-
pointees, fail to explain the skewed partisan outcome uncovered in the data.
To understand the operation of judicial elections which are nonpartisan
in form but partisan in results, it may be helpful to explore the universe
of appellate judges elected in the past decade, the turnout of voters at
the polls, and voter response to the judicial ballot.
B. Participation in judicial Elections
Is the electorate apathetic or acquiescent with respect to judicial elec-
subsequent election (chi square = 12.5233, p < .001). Between 1960 and 1970, seven su-
preme court appointees have run for election; all three Democratic justices were defeated, while
all four Republicans were elected. In the appellate judiciary as a whole in the past decade, six
of seven Democratic appointees were defeated, while 12 of 13 Republican appointees were elected
(chi square = 12.1748, p < .001).
33 The 1953 appointment across party lines was made by Governor Frank Lausche (Dem.).
His Republican appointee was Judge James Collier of the Fourth District Court of Appeals.
34 Herndon classified state elections as "stable," meaning no shift in party control of the
gubernatorial office; "proximate shift," referring to the displacement of the party in office by
the opposing party winning 50.1-54.9 percent of the vote; and "gross shift," measured by parti-
san displacement when the displacing party wins more than 55 percent of the statewide two-
party vote. Only a "gross shift" appeared to have a significant effect on judicial races. Her-
don, supra note 27, at 69-70.
35Judge John W. Keefe of the First District Court of Appeals, appointed in 1961 by
Governor Di Salle, was defeated in 1962 by Republican C. Watson Hover.
3 6 In 1970, Governor Rhodes' supreme court appointees Chief Justice O'Neill and Justices
Robert Duncan, J. J. P. Corrigan, and Leonard Stem, and appeals court appointees John M.
Manos and Alvin I. Krenzler in the Eighth District, and Judge Robert E. Leach (later elevated
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tions, as could be inferred from Herndon's hypothesis of the "normal"
pattern? No data on participation are included in his study, and few
systematic measurements of this dimension of judicial politics can be
found in the literature, in spite of the fact that 32 of the 50 states have
elective judicial systems.37  In a study of the Texas judicial system, Hen-
derson and Sinclair note that since 50 per cent of the state's appellate
judges attained their position initially by appointment, the state has "pri-
marily an appointive system." ' The elected half of the judges as well as
tie voters who chose them are eliminated from further consideration, and
the study treats the politics of appointment, involving the governor and
the bar. Ladinsky and Silver examined the judicial electorate in Wis-
consin in 1964-65, finding that 30 per cent of the eligible voters partici-
pated in a hotly-contested, policy-oriented election for a supreme court
seat."9 However, since no data for participation in choices for other
kinds of public office are provided, relative judgments about "high" or
"low" participation are difficult to make. Jacob's study of popular atti-
tudes toward judicial politics relates actual participation in the work of the
courts (as litigants, jurors or witnesses) to voting in Wisconsin judicial
elections.40 Based on responses from a clustered area probability sample,
Jacob found no significant difference in self-reported voting rates in the
spring, 1963 judicial election between those who had participated in the
work of the courts (35.5 per cent voted) and those who had not been
involved in the judicial process (31.9 per cent voted). 41
If the electorate were apathetic about judicial elections, we would ex-
pect fewer people voting for judges than for executives or legislators.
To test the hypothesis that participation in judicial electoral politics is
significantly lower than in legislative or executive elections, data were col-
lected on participation in both primary and general elections for judicial
candidates, and for the top partisan candidate on the Ohio ballot (ex-
cluding the presidency), as follows: 1960, state auditor; 1962, governor;
1964, U.S. senator; 1966, governor; 1968, U.S. senator; and 1970, gover-
nor. "42 "Participation" in both primary and general election judicial con-
tests is measured by the per cent voting in the judicial race of the total
voting in the top partisan race.
to the supreme court) were elected. T. Brown, Secretary of State, Ohio Election Statistics 1967-
68 passir; (1969); id. 1969-70 (1971).
37 Seventeen states provide partisan elections for the state judiciary; fifteen have nonpartisan
elections. H. JAcoB & K. VINEs, PouiTcs iN THE AMmiCAN STATiS 279 (2d ed. 1971).
38 B. HENDERSON & T. SiNCLaIR, JuDiciAL SELECTION iN TEXAS 20 (1964).
29 Ladinsky & Silver, Popular Democracy and Judicial Independence: Electorate and Elite
Reactions to Two Wisconsin Supreme Court Elections, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 128, 154 (1967).
40 Jacob, Judicial Insulation-Elections, Direct Participation and Public Attention to the
Courts in Wisconsin, 1966 Wis. L REV. 801, 813 (1966).
411d. at 841.
4 2 The top partisan race in 1960 was state auditor, due to the institution of the four-year
gubernatorial term in 1958.
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1. Primary Contests and Voter Participation
First, a low level of candidate activity in judicial races is suggested
by the fact that only 16.7 per cent of the total possible supreme court
races in the decade were contested in each party's primaries. Second, a low
level of voter activity is reflected in significantly lower participation in
supreme court primary races than in executive and legislative races, with the
exception of the 1960 Republican primary, in which the top office (state
auditor) was uncontested 3 The absence of a Republican primary con-
test for state auditor illustrates the fact that absence of contests may char-
acterize the selection process for executive or legislative as well as judi-
cial office. Third, it is significant that that with one exception, participa-
tion is lower in Democratic than in Republican judicial primaries; that is,
Democratic voters are less likely to complete their ballots from top par-
tisan office through judicial candidates than Republican voters.
Participation in the 31 opposed primary races for the intermediate
courts of appeals shows a similar pattern. The unit of measure is partid-
pation rate by district, in 10 districts from 1960-66, and 11 districts
from 1968-70. Contested races have been aggregated for the 12 pri-
maries, by level of participation, as follows: "low" participation occurs
when less than 75 per cent of those voting in the statewide top partisan
race vote in the appeals court race; "moderate" participation falls be-
tween 75 and 90 per cent; and "high" participation is found when more
than 90 per cent of the voters in the top partisan race vote for the appeals
bench candidates.44
43 TABLE 2
STATEWIDE PRIMARY PARTICIPATION IN OPPOSED SUPREME COURT RACES As
PER CENT OF VOTE FOR Top PARTISAN OFFICE, 1960-70
Year Republican Primary Democratic Primary
1960 103.7% (a)
1962 84.9 65.7%
1964 74.1 69.5
1966 (a) 83.8
1968 (a) (a)
1970 (a) (a)
(a) No contest
Calculated from Ohio Election Statistics supra note 31.
44 TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF PARTICIPATION RATES IN OPPOSED COURTS OF APPEALS
PRIMARY RACES, BY DIsTRcr, 1960-70
Republican Primary Democratic Primary
No. of Per No. of Per
Participation Districts Cent Districts Cent
Low (under 75%) 1 5.6% 6 46.1%
Moderate (75-90%) 11 61.1 5 38.5
High (over 90%) 6 33.3 2 15.4
Total 18 100.0 13 100.0
Chi square = 7.2023 p < .05
Calculated from Ohio Election Statistics, supra note 31.
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The most striking finding revealed by the distribution of participation
rates in appeals court primaries is the significantly greater activism among
both Republican candidates and Republican voters than among their Dem-
ocratic counterparts.
In the Republican appeals court primaries, 20.2 per cent of the total
races were contested, in contrast to 14.6 per cent of the appeals court
races in the Democratic primaries. Higher participation rates of Repub-
lican voters are indicated by the fact that a third of the Republican ap-
pellate judicial contests attracted over 90 per cent of those who voted in
the top partisan contest, while in less than 6 per cent of the Republican
races, participation was low. In the Democratic primary contests for ap-
peals judge, only 15 per cent of the races attracted high participation,
while almost half of the contests drew low levels of participation. In
individual counties, even wider discrepancies in partisan patterns of ac-
tivism emerge. Over 100 per cent of those voting in legislative and exec-
utive contests made judicial choices in 24 counties in the Republican pri-
maries, while this high a participation rate occurred in only 3 counties
in the Democratic judicial primaries in the same period.45
2. General Elections and Voter Participation
In turning to the November election of appellate judges, it is impor-
tant to recall that judges are selected on a separate, nonpartisan ballot,
unlike the primary ballot which is, of course, partisan, and which lists all
offices to be filled on the same ballot. Contests occur more frequently in
judicial general elections than in the primaries. In the supreme court,
84.2 per cent, or 16 of the total 19 races from 1960-70, were contested.
Participation in these contested races was "moderate," as defined above.46
In no race did statewide voting for a supreme court justice exceed voting in
the partisan races. This confirms the expectation that separation of the
45 The extreme high participation rate in the data is found in Mahoning County in the 1964
Democratic primary when 163 per cent of those voting in the Young-Glenn senate race voted in
a contested court of appeals race. The lowest rates by county were found in the 1968 Democratic
primary when the Lausche-Gilligan contest for the senate induced unusually high participation
in the partisan race. This illustrates the care with which these data must be interpreted, since
the fluctuations in voting patterns may be due to an exciting partisan contest at the top of the
ballot, not to unusual apathy in the judicial contest.
46 TABLE 4
PARTICIPATION RATES IN SUPRBmE COURT GENERAL ELECrION
CoNTET s, 1960-70
Supreme Court Races
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1960 84.7% 83.5% 87.7%
1962 85.4 79.2 79.7
1964 78.5 81.2 75.4 76.6%
1966 81.1 80.2
1968 82.8 75.5
1970 83.9 78.2
Calculated from Ohio Election Statistics, supra note 31.
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nonpartisan judicial ballot from the partisan executive and legislative
ballot would increase the fall-off in voting which normally occurs even
from top to bottom of the partisan ballot.
Peak participation rates (about 85 per cent of those voting for top
partisan office) are shown in a 1960 race involving a popular former
governor, and a 1962 race in which a Republican incumbent justice engen-
dered unusual excitement by challenging (and defeating) the aging Demo-
cratic chief justice.
In the general elections for the courts of appeals, 62.9 per cent, or 56
of the total 89 races, were contested. As in the supreme court elections,
in no case did more voters participate in judicial races than in the top
partisan race. The participation rates by district show voter activity rela-
tively constant over both time and area, with 85.7 per cent of the races
falling in the "moderate" category; the other 14.3 per cent showing "low"
participation.47
C. Ohio's Republican judiciary
Ohio's nonpartisan elective method of staffing the bench appears to
produce partisan results. One of the most striking characteristics of the
state's appellate judiciary (and one of which few people are aware) is the
Republican affiliation of a large majority of its members. Almost three-
fourths of the accessions to Ohio's appellate bench in the 1960's were
Republican; slightly more than one-fourth were Democratic. These pro-
portions held roughly true whether the judges were appointed by the gov-
ernor to fill an unexpired term, or elected by the voters.48
Republican candidates for the appellate bench in Ohio are not only
more likely to win than Democratic candidates, but are also more likely
to win in runaway contests-that is, by more than 60 per cent of the vote.
When the winning margins of appellate judges are classified by intensity
-close, moderate, and rnmaway-the disparity between the parties is evi-
dent. Only 16.7 per cent of Republican appellate judges in Ohio won in
"close" contests, compared to 44.4 per cent of Democratic winners; 53.7
per cent of successful Republican candidates won in "runaway" contests,
47 Calculated from Ohio Election Statistics, supra note 31.
48 TABLE 5
AccEssIoNs OF OHio APPELiATE JUDGES, BY LEVEL OF COURT,
IVMTHOD OF ACCESSION, AD PARTY AFFILIATION, 1960-70
Level of Elected Appointed Total
Court Rep. Dem. Total Rep. Dem. Total Rep. Dem. Total
Supreme Court 17 2 19 5 3 8 22 5 27
Appeals Court 63 26 89 12 4 16 75 30 105
Total
Number 80 28 108 17 7 24 97 35 132
% by Party 74.1% 25.9% 100.0% 70.8% 29.2% 100.0% 73.5% 26.5% 100.0%
Calculated from Ohio Election Statistics, supra note 31.
OHIO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
while only 22.2 per cent of Democratic appellate judges experienced such
success. 
49
A simple explanation of this heavy Republican majority on the appel-
late bench would be that Ohio is a Republican state, and as in other po-
sitions of public trust, Ohio voters tend to prefer Republicans in the ju-
diciary. This is too simple a conclusion, however, since Ohio has been a
highly competitive arena for the two major parties from 1960 to 1970, and,
in fact, throughout its history"o Substantial swings between parties
have occurred in statewide popular voting, and Democratic candidates have
carried the state for five of twelve major executive and legislative offices.5
Because no such alternation of party successes has occurred in the state
judiciary, there is still a Republican advantage in the judicial elections
to be explained.
40 TABLE 6
"INTENSITY" OF T VOTE, CONTESTE RACES FOR THE OHIO
APPELLATE JUDICIARY, 1960-70a
Margin of Republicaln Democratic Total
Victory Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent
50.1-55% 9 16.7% 8 44.4% 17 23.6%
55.1-60% 16 29.6 6 33.3 22 30.6
Over 60% 29 53.7 4 22.2 33 45.8
Total 54 100.0 18 99.9 72 100.0
Chi square = 7.3916 p < .05
a Classification scheme, with the extremes of "close" and "runaway" elections, is borrowed
from Jacob, supra note 40, at 807.
5 0 In a seminal historical analysis of Ohio politics published in 1960, Thomas A. Flinn
provides data on state and national elections showing Ohio to be a "competitive two-party
state in which the Repulicans enjoy the advantage;" elections for governor were "incredibly
even contests" even before 1900, and from 1900-1958, "the Republicans won only 12 guberna-
torial contests to nineteen for their opponents." Flinn, Outline of Ohio Politics, 13 WEST.
POL. Q. 702, 702-21 (1960). The ethnic-sectional bases of this competitive pattern, cutting
across socioeconomic and status cleavages, are analyzed in Flinn, Continuity and Change in Ohio
Politics, 24 J. POL. 521, 521-44 (1962). Ohio is classified as "two-party competitive" for the
period 1956-1970 by Austin Ranney's "index of competitiveness" in Jacob & Vines, supra note
37, at 87. The concept of competition is measured by three basic dimensions: "Proportion of
Success: the percentage of the votes won by each party for statewide offices and the percentage
of seats in the legislature held by each. Duration of Success: the length of time each party has
controlled the statewide offices and/or the legislature. Frequency of Divided Control: the pro-
portion of time in which control of the governorship and legislature has been divided between
the parties." Id. at 85.
51 TABLE 7
PER CENT REPUBLICAN OF THE POPULAR VOTE FOR MAJOR
STATEwIDE OFFICES IN OHIO, 1960-70
Oice 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970
President 53.3% 37.1% 45.2*
U.S. Senator __ 38.4% 49.8__ 51.5 49.7"
Governor -- 58.9-- 62.2% 44.5
Cong.-at-Large __ 60.5 47.8 ......
* Per cent Republican of the three-party vote; American Independent Party candidate in the
race.
* * Per cent Republican of the four-party vote; American Independent Party and Socialist
Labor Party candidates in the race.
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1. The Nonpartisan Ballot
The major structural difference between executive and legislative elec-
tions in Ohio on the one hand, and judicial elections on the other, is the
nonpartisan ballot. Numerous studies of nonjudicial elections have
shown the tendency of nonpartisan electoral systems to provide advantages
to upper-income, better-educated voters, who tend to identify with the
Republican party.52 There are two major dimensions of political be-
havior involved in this phenomenon: political preference, and participa-
tion. People in upper socio-economic groups tend to vote Republican, a
dimension of political preference. Persons of generally high socio-
economic status are also the most highly educated members of the political
system, and education levels are associated with political activity, a dimen-
sion of participation. Thus those who tend to vote Republican are the
most likely to be psychologically capable of conceptualizing political
events, the most likely to talk about politics, thus becoming "opinion
leaders," and the most likely to vote. 53 The high proportion of organiza-
tional memberships among these upper-income, politically active voters
provides them with more cues which would enable them to cope with the
directionless nonpartisan judicial ballot.
In contrast, lower-income, less-educated voters, who tend to vote Dem-
ocratic and to vote less regularly,5" are more likely to be bewildered
by the unlabeled names on a nonpartisan ballot. Responding to this
bewilderment, Democratic voters are more likely to withdraw from mak-
ing a selection (the familiar phenomenon of the "fall-off" from the parti-
san to the nonpartisan ballot), or to vote for a familiar name, reassured
in those rare cases by the warmth of recognition that they can do their
civic duty (vote) in a not altogether meaningless way. Since judges have
less opportunity to develop a political personality of which the voter
may become aware, judicial nonpartisan choices are even more remote
from the lower-income, less-educated voter than are other nonpartisan
elections such as local councilmanic races.
The data on participation have shown higher participation by Repub-
licans than Demcrats in judicial partisan primaries55 and significant
electoral success for Republican candidates in the nonpartisan elections.,
The missing piece of evidence in the analysis is the behavior of the voter
in casting his ballot for judges. A search of the literature has revealed
that public opinion research on attitudes toward judicial candidates and
52 H. BONE & A. RANNEY, PoLmcs AND VOTERS 111-13 (2d ed. 1967); E. LEE,
THE POLITICS OF NONPARTISANSHIP 139-40 (1960); C. Adrian, Some General Characteristics
of Nonpartisan Elections, 66 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 766, 766-76 (1952).
53 Bone & Ranney, supra note 52, at 27-8.
54 Bone & Ranney, supra note 52, at 27-8.
5 5 See notes 43 and 44, supra.
56 See note 48, supra.
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elections has been conducted only in Wisconsin,57 where nonpartisan
judicial primaries and separate (April) elections create a strikingly dif-
ferent political setting for judicial selection from that in Ohio. Public
opinion research is beyond the scope of this study, but should be under-
taken to explore crucial attitudinal variables. In the meantime, election
statistics have been analyzed for clues about the linkages between patterns
of participation and electoral results.
2. Supreme Court Races
The only empirical data on partisan voting in judicial elections located
in a search of the literature are found in Davis' analysis of the partisan
elective judiciary of West Virginia.58  Davis calculated an average vote,
measured by per cent Democratic, for six top state executive offices in
eight elections from 1928 through 1956, and found that the vote for su-
preme court judge on the same partisan ballot in each of those elections
deviated from the average party vote by less than one per cent. 9 In
contrast, in Ohio wide fluctuations occur between the statewide per cent
of a party's vote for top partisan office and for judicial candidates of that
party on the nonpartisan ballot.6
In 12 of the 16 supreme court races, the Democratic judicial candidate
won a lesser share of the statewide vote than the party's top candidate
on the partisan ballot, reflecting the characteristics of Democratic voting
suggested above. In the four cases in which the Democratic candidate
on the judicial ballot ran ahead of the party's top partisan candidate,
the characteristics of long-term incumbency and famous name appear to
explain the judicial candidate's advantage."'
In contrast to the deviation in judicial voting under one per cent from
the average party vote, as in West Virginia with its partisan judicial bal-
57Jacob, supra note 40.
58 C. DAVIS, JuDIciAL SELEcrION IN WEST VIRGINIA (1959).
59 Id. at 26-7.
60 TABLE 8
PER CENT DEMOCRATIC OF THE VOTE FOR ToP STATE PARTISAN OFFICE
AND FOR SUPREME COuRT CONTESTS, WITH DIFFERENCES, 1960-70
Top State Race Sup. Ct. #1 Sup. Ct. #2 SuP. Ct. #3 Sup. Ct. #4
Year % Democratic % Dem. Diff. % Dem. Diff. % Dem. Diff. % Dem. Diff.
1960 40.8% 54.5% 13.7a 37.7% -3.1 38.4% -2.4 ... ...
1962 41.1 49.97 8.9a 36.6 -4.5 34.4 -6.7 ---
1964 50.2 59.4 9.2a 32.4 -17.8 48.4 -1.8 33.7% -16.5
1966 37.8 43.7 5.9b 31.6 -6.2 ... ... ... ...
1968 48.5 38.5 -10.0 28.7 -19.8 ... ... ... ...
1970 55.5 31.0 -24.5 44.0 -11.5 ... ... ... ...
a Long-time Democratic incumbents ran for re-election.
b A Democrat named Brown (Clifford) ran for the supreme court.
Calculated from Ohio Election Statistics, supra note 31.
61 Brown candidacies in Ohio judicial process repeatedly show results due to the venerable
character of the name as a traditional Republican symbol
1971]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
lot, we find Ohio supreme court justices running from 13.7 per cent
ahead of the top partisan candidate to 24.5 per cent behind the ticket
leader. 62  Recalling the two criteria set forth at the outset of this study,
we can now see that Ohio's appellate judges are not independent, since
they still depend on popular choice; nor are they accountable, since it is
apparent from the spread in electoral support that voters who choose them
cannot identify their value orientations or their decisional propensities.
Because statewide election statistics may obscure significant variations
in patterns of partisan support, the Democratic per cent of the two-
party vote was calculated by county for these supreme court races and
the top partisan races. A matrix of correlation coefficients for the six
partisan and 16 nonpartisan races shows striking relationships in vot-
ing patterns. First, the matrix of correlation coefficients of the partisan
races with each other partisan race shows that the distribution of support
for partisan candidates in the 88 counties of Ohio remained relatively
constant through the decade of the 1960's.63 This is not surprising,
since the pattern of Republican and Democratic party strength has deep
historical roots in Ohio politics.64 The 'coefficients are extremely high,
showing that where Democratic strength is low (or high) for one parti-
san office in one election, it tends to be low (or high) in the next elec-
tion, and for a different office. The slight declines in the strength of the
relationships over a decade of voting show that although some shifts in
partisan strength have occurred, either through population mobility or
changes in partisan attachments, these shifts have been incremental and
relatively steady over time. 5
As we would expect, due to the intervention of the nonpartisan judi-
cial ballot, the correlation coefficients for voting in partisan and non-
62 Supra note 60.
63 TABLE 9
CoRRELATIoN CoEFFICIENT MATRiX, ToP PARTISAN RAcES, 1960-70a
Aud. Gov. Sen. Gov, Sen. Gov.
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970
1960, Auditor 1.0
1962, Governor .89 1.0
1964, Senator .86 .86 1.0
1966, Governor .77 .84 .82 1.0
1968, Senator .69 .76 .78 .85 1.0
1970, Governor .63 .73 .68 .82 .91 1.0
a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient.
Calculated from Ohio Election Statistics, supra note 31.
64 Flinn, Outline of Ohio Politics, and Continuity and Change in Ohio Politics, supra note 50.
65 This consistency in voting patterns for partisan office suggests that the inability to mea-
sure the vote for the same top partisan office in each election is not a serious defect in the data.
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partisan races are neither as high nor as consistent2" Although all the
relationships are strong enough, either positively or negatively, to be sta-
tistically significant (less than one time out of a thousand could the rela-
tionship occur by chance), the range is from a high of .81 to a low of
.29. The high point in apparently coherent partisan voting occurred in
the 1960 supreme court race number 2, where the name Taft, not yet as-
sociated in the voters' minds with the bench, evoked a strong partisan re-
sponse.
The three lowest coefficients can most reasonably be interpreted as il-
lustrations of the common twin phenomena of voting for familiar names
and endorsing long-term incumbents. In supreme court race number 3 in
1960,7 popular former governor O'Neill was the Republican candidate
for the bench, and appears to have drawn stronger than normal support
in Democratic as well as Republican counties. In supreme court race num-
ber 2 in 1962,68 the Republican nominee had been an incumbent since 1954,
when he won the seat his father had held since 1914; hence the name
Matthias, having been on the judicial ballot for 48 years, was highly famil-
iar to the voters regardless of party. Inspection of county voting data in
supreme court race number 1 in 19669 reveals high support in Republi-
can counties for a Democratic candidate named Brown, a traditional Re-
publican name in Ohio politics.
The effect of candidates whose party affiliations betray the electorate's
expectations about their names is most dramatic in supreme court race
number 2 in 1970. This race was a confrontation between two famous
names in Ohio politics, with a reversal of the expected party affiliation: a
Democratic Brown (Allen) opposing a Republican Corrigan (J.J.P.).
An inspection of the data shows Brown winning majorities in small,
rural Republican counties, while Corrigan won 74.6 per cent of the vote
in Democratic Cuyahoga County, where the "friends and neighbors" vote
Go TABLE 10
CORRELATION COEFFIaENT MATix, ToP PARTISIAN RAcEs AND CONTE=Sm
SUPREmE COURT RAcES, BY COUNTY, 1960-70a
Top Partisan Supreme Court Races
Office #1 #2 #3 #4
1960, Auditor .51 .81 .29
1962, Governor .68 .38 A9
1964, Senator A4 .61 A3 .52
1966, Governor .39 .63
1968, Senator .50 .41
1970, Governor .42 -. 42
a Although these coefficients are not derived from a sample population, note that
all r's are significant at .001, 86 df, except 1960 Aud./Sup. Ct. #3, which is signifi-
cant at .01.
Calculated from Ohio Election Statistics, supra note 31.
07 1960, Auditor/Sup. Ct. number 3, r = .29, supra note 66.
08 1962, Governor/SupCt. number 2, r = .38 supra note 66.
09 1966 Governor/Sup.Ct. number 1, r = .39, supra note 66.
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of his home city enhanced the advantage of his "Democratic" name,
and where he ran six percentage points ahead of the winning Democratic
gubernatorial candidate. The fact that the voters misidentified the candi-
dates and responded to them in a relatively partisan way is shown by the
significant negative correlation between the vote by county for governor
and for this seat on the bench.70
Another way of testing the significance of the difference between the
vote, by county, on the partisan and nonpartisan ballots, is a difference
of means testy1 The only contested supreme court race in which there
was no significant difference in the mean Democratic vote in the counties
of Ohio on the partisan and nonpartisan ballots was the K. Taft-Ellison
race in 1960, noted earlier as the most partisan of the decade for the
supreme court. All other supreme court races show significant 'fluctuations
in voting patterns, either negative or positive, from the relatively steady and
consistent pattern of voting for executives and legislators.
In seven races, the Democratic judicial candidate garnered a signifi-
cantly larger share of the vote than the top partisan candidate of the
Democratic party in the counties of Ohio. These races involved the fea-
tures noted earlier, long-term incumbents and Democrats named Brown.
In eight races, the top partisan candidate ran significantly ahead of the
Democratic judicial candidate across the 88 counties.7 2  This apparently
70 1970, Governor/Sup. Ct. number 2, r = -.42, supra note 66.
71 TABLE 11
DIFmERENcE OF MEANs, PER CENT DEMOCRATIC OF THE VOTE FOR Top PARTIsAN
OFFicE AND SUPREME COURT RAcEs, By COUNTY, 1960-70a
Year and Republican Democratic Mean T Level of
S.C. Race Candidate Candidate Difference Value Significance
1960 (1) Hoover *Bell -15.6 -24.022 .001
(2) *K. Taft Ellison .001 .002 ns
(3) *O'Neill Peck 2.0 2.192 .05
1962 (1-CJ) *K. Taft Weygandt -7.0 -11.859 .001
(2) *Matthias Mayer -1.9 -2.515 .05
(3) *P. Herbert Cole 2.8 4.046 .001
1962 (1) Douglas *Zimmerman -9A -13.522 .001
(2) *ONeill Bryan 15.1 29.023 .001
(3) *Schneider Griffith -4.2 -5.146 .001
(4) *P. Brown Gibson 17.1 28.118 .001
1966 (1) *Schneider C. Brown -12.5 -17.943 .001
(2) *P. Brown Bryan 6.8 14.685 .001
1968 (1-CJ) *K. Taft Duffy 8.0 11.328 .001
(2) *T. Herbert Brothers 15.3 20.531 .001
1970 (1-CJ) *O'Neill Bryant 18.9 24.505 .001
(2) *Corrigan A. Brown -3.0 -2.012 .05
* Denotes winner.
a Difference of means test, t test at 87 df. At. .001, t = 3A21; at .01, t = 2.638; at .05,
t = 1.991.
Calculated from Ohio Election Statistics, supra note 31.
72 Supra note 71. Negative values of t show that the Democratic judicial candidate won a
higher mean county vote than the top partisan candidate; positive t values show that the partisan
candidate had the higher mean vote.
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inconsistent pattern of partisan voting confirms the hypothesis that Re-
publican success in the judiciary is not simply a reflection of a Republi-
can-dominant state, but results from the complex effects of the nonparti-
san ballot.
A final characteristic to be noted here of supreme court voting in
Ohio is its insulation from state and national trends, also attributable to
the separate, nonpartisan ballot. Strong Republican tides in state politics
in 1962 and 1966, a strong national Democratic trend in 1964, and a
strong state Democratic trend in 1970 had no significant effect on judicial
voting in the state. In these four tidal years, the politics of judicial elec-
tions exhibited their usual erratic patterns, and illustrated the lack of
accountability in this method of judicial selection.
3. Courts of Appeals Races
Districting for the courts of appeals is done by law in Ohio.73  The
legislature divided the state into 10 judicial districts for the years prior to
1967, and 11 districts since 1968. This division of the state into judi-
cial districts introduces a new variable into analysis of judicial elections.
Because of the uneven distribution of party strength in the state, differen-
tial benefits and handicaps are created for one party or the other, how-
ever the state is districted. To examine this variable, an index of appor-
tionment7 4 was calculated for the judicial districts, as well as the per cent
voting Democratic in the district for the top partisan race, the per cent
of the appeals judge vote in the district cast for the Democratic candi-
date in the 56 contested races from 1960 to 1970, and "participation" on
the nonpartisan ballot, as per cent voting for appeals judge of those vot-
ing for the top partisan office. Correlation coefficients were calculated
for each pair of variables.
It may be recalled that in the supreme court races, even though there
were wide partisan discrepancies between voting for a justice and voting
for an executive or legislative candidate, there was still an observable
tendency among a significant number of voters to vote consistently.7 In
the 56 courts of appeals races, even this tendency disappears, and there is
no relationship between voting for the judge nominated by one's party
and voting for the top executive or legislative candidate nominated by
73 Omo Co s-. art. IV, § 3.
74 The David-Eisenberg Index relates the population of a district to the mean population of
all districts in the state. Equality of population (i.e., perfect apportionment) would be indi-
cated by DE (v) = 1, for all districts. A vote value (v) greater than 1 indicates overrepresenta-
tion (smaller district population per judge than the mean population of all judidal districts),
while a vote value (v) less than 1 indicates underrepresentation (larger district population per
judge than the mean population of all judicial districts). Although this measure has generally
been applied to legislative districts, it can be used as a valid index to representation in any
geographically-distributed electoral system. 1 P. DAVID & R. EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF
THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN VOTE 18 (1962).
7 5 See supra note 66.
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that party.7 It is not entirely dear why this difference between supreme
court and intermediate appeals court voting should exist. It is possible
that the greater perceived salience of supreme court elections for those
who do vote the nonpartisan ballot helps some voters overcome the con-
fusion due to lack of a party label. At least it can be said that the ap-
peals court judges' location "closer to the people" does not necessarily
mean more clearly identifiable, again diminishing the possibility of ac-
countability.
In the appeals court races, as in supreme court races, Democratic voters
are clearly less likely to vote the nonpartisan ballot than Republican
voters.' 7 When participation rates are high on the nonpartisan ballot, how-
ever, suggesting that more Democratic voters are voting for judicial
candidates, there is not greater support for Democratic judicial candi-
dates.78 Since these voters may not know how to vote Democratic in
the absence of a party label, the nonpartisan ballot appears to function as
intended, to interrupt partisan patterns of voting.
The measure of apportionment suggests that judicial districts which
could be expected to elect Democratic judges were over-populated as drawn
from 1960-66. The more people voting Democratic on the partisan bal-
lot, the lower the value of each vote-that is, the farther the district
was from the standard of one-man, one-vote. 79 The existence of a Re-
publican gerrymander by malapportionment of the state legislative districts
prior to 19660 makes it possible to speculate that the party in control of
districting viewed the state judiciary as a component of the partisan sys-
tem of rewards and deprivations through electoral patronage.
The overconcentration of population in Democratic districts, however,
does not lead to greater support for Democratic judicial candidates in
those districts,8 1 again suggesting voter confusion on the nonpartisan bal-
76 Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient is used in this and subsequent analysis;
r = .21, not significant
77 The more people voting Democratic in partisan races in the district, the lower the propor-
tion voting the nonpartisan ballot. This is confirmed by a significant negative relationship
(r = -. 32, p < .02) between the Democratic vote on the partisan ballot and the participation
rates in contested courts of appeals races.
78 Partidpation rates are negatively correlated with voting rates for Democratic judicial can-
didates (r = -. 23, p < .10).
79 A significant negative relationship exists between per cent Democratic of the vote for
partisan office and the David-Eisenberg Index of Apportionment (r = -. 34, p < .05). Due
to the addition of District Eleven in 1968, the index has been calculated separately for the periods
1960-66, and 1968-70. The United States Supreme Court's one-man, one-vote standards estab-
lished for legislative elections in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) diminished the chances of a gerrymander by population imbalance
in the 1968 judicial redistricting, although the rule has not been extended specifically to judicial
districts.
so K. Barber, Reapportionment in Ohio and Michigan: Political Revolution Reconsidered,
146-154 (1968) (Ph.D. dissertation Case Western Reserve Univ.).
81 The correlation between the Index of Apportionment (1960-66) and per cent voting for
Democratic candidates on the judicial ballot is not significant (r = .15).
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lot. Manipulation of judicial district boundaries for partisan purposes
could be a factor contributing to Republican dominance in the state judi-
ciary as in the state legislature, but the evidence for this hypothesis is
obviously inconclusive.
A variable which may be relevant here but which is not susceptible to
statistical analysis is the strength of the party organization in a judicial
district. Since nominations for the primaries are customarily made by
the county party leaders in any given judicial district, the variability among
districts in voter turnout and candidate success may relate to the strength
or political style of operation of the party organizations. This point
may be illustrated by contrasting an intensely competitive judicial district
(the Seventh) with a district (the Ninth) where only one of seven pos-
sible appeals court races in the decade from 1960 to 1970 was contested,
and that single contested race was for an unexpired term.8'
Both districts have elected a bipartisan bench: five Republicans and
four Democrats in the Seventh, four Republicans and three Democrats in
the Ninth. It could be hypothesized that in the Seventh District, strong
party organizations compete strenuously and regularly in the electorate
for judicial office; while in the Ninth, strong party organizations (ca-
pable of shutting out attempts by mavericks to enter the primaries) divide
the judicial offices by mutual agreement (with rare exceptions), and avoid
the necessity and inconvenience of competing in the electorate. Addi-
tional evidence of strong party control in the Ninth District may be drawn
from the one judicial race (1966), in which the Democratic candidate
for the appeals bench won a proportion of the total vote (40.9 per
cent) uncannily close to that won by the Democratic candidate for gov-
ernor (40.5 per cent). In the absence of a careful investigation of the
political culture in individual judicial districts, such propositions must re-
main speculative.
D. Summary of Empirical Findings
To summarize the empirical findings about the nonpartisan elective
judiciary of Ohio:
The appellate judiciary of Ohio is largely elective, in practice as well
as theory.
The appellate judges who gain access to the bench by gubernatorial
appointment tend to be defeated by the electorate for the unexpired term
if they are Democratic, and elected if they are Republican.
82 The Seventh District (1960-66), the most overpopulated district (DE[v] = .688), con-
tained the following counties: Ashtabula, Belmont, Carroll, Columbiana, Geauga, Harrison, Jef-
ferson, Lake, Mahoning, Monroe, Noble, Portage and Trumbull. After redistricting (1968),
the Seventh District contained: Belmont, Carroll, Columbiana, Harrison, Jefferson, Mahoning,
Monroe and Noble (DE[v] = 1.169). The Ninth District, unaffected by redistricting, com-
bined the following counties for the entire period: Lorain, Medina, Summit, and Wayne.
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The appellate judiciary of Ohio, elected on a nonpartisan ballot, is
overwhelmingly Republican in party affiliation. Not only are Republican
candidates more likely to win judicial races, but Republican winners are
significantly more likely to win by wide margins than the relatively few
Democratic winners.
Higher participation in Republican than in Democratic judicial pri-
maries suggests a higher level of interest in and concern about the judi-
ciary among Republican than Democratic voters. This interest appears to
be carried into the elections, in which Republican candidates not only win
more often, but win by greater margins on the nonpartisan judicial bal-
lot than do Democratic candidates. Higher Republican participation re-
flects the wider organizational affiliations, greater access to channels of
communication, and stronger political motivation characteristic of better-
educated, higher-income voters.
Lower-income, less-educated voters, who tend to be Democratic, are
less likely to vote the judicial ballot because they are confused by the lack
of a cognitive map supplied on the partisan ballot by the party label,
are less motivated by an education-oriented sense of civic duty to vote
the judicial ballot, have less information about judicial candidates, and,
lacking knowledge or direction, are likely to vote only when they recognize
a familiar name.
The electorate responds to supreme court races somewhat more coher-
ently than to contests for the courts of appeals.
Significant relationships are found between voting for a supreme court
justice and for the top executive and legislative candidate; the wide dis-
crepancies which were identified appear to be attributable to long-term
incumbencies which develop familiarity of the name on the judicial ballot;
and to the partisan misidentification of well-known names.
Appeals court voting exhibits no underlying consistency with partisan
patterns; at this level, the nonpartisan ballot appears to be most "suc-
cessful" in reducing the potentiality of accountability to a minimum.
IV. LAwYBRs AND JUDGES
The empirical results of Ohio's nonpartisan judicial election system
illustrate the "invisible" characteristics identified at the outset of this in-
vestigation. The alternative "invisible" means of staffing the bench, the
Missouri Plan, is currently being promoted not only by the state bar as-
sociation in Ohio, but also by the American Bar Association and the Amer-
ican Judicature Society across the nation for selection of state judges,
and at the federal level for staffing the federal courts. This combination
elective-appointive plan has been adopted with minor variations by thir-
teen states for selection of supreme court judges; five of these states
use it for staffing the intermediate appellate courts, and in sixteen states
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some trial courts or courts of limited and special jurisdiction are staffed by
this method.8 3
The basic assumption of the plan is that judges are "a special type of
public official for which the Bar has a unique responsibility."" The
central feature of the plan is an official nominating commission on which
the organized bar and laymen appointed by the governor have equal rep-
resentation. The commission submits to the governor a panel of ju-
dicial candidates from which the appointment to a vacancy on the bench
must be made. The electorate participates in a referendum after a period
of judicial service, when the judge runs "against his record," and may be
retained or turned out of office. "
Watson and Downing's thoroughly documented study of Missouri's 25
years of experience with this plan leads to a number of significant con-
clusions. The politics of the governor and the bar have replaced the pol-
itics of county chairmen and voters in the judicial selection process.8 6 The
bar itself has become politicized, with the development of a virtual
two-party system operating in the election of bar representatives to the
nominating commissions.1s  In the metropolitan areas of Missouri, distinct
bar associations represent opposing interests: one group tends to repre-
sent plaintiffs' lawyers and criminal attorneys in solo practice or in small
firms, with lower median income, Democratic party affiliation, and legal
education at a local law school; while members of the other group tend
to be corporation attorneys and defendants' lawyers in large law firms,
with a higher median income, Republican party affiliation, and legal edu-
cation at "prestige" law schools out of state. These bar groups sponsor
competing candidates for the lawyers' positions on the nominating com-
missions. Although a few appear to be concerned with patronage payoffs
-judicial positions for themselves or for their friends, most do appear to
seek "policy payoffs." "[T]hey want to get persons on the Bench who
will be sympathetic, or at least not hostile, to their clients' interests."8"
The lay members of the nominating commissions in Missouri have been
drawn largely from the business community, and have tended to reflect
the attitudes and preferences of lawyers they know best, those represent-
ing their own business interests.8"
Finally, a majority of lawyers evaluate plan-selected judges as "better"
than those selected under the former system of partisan elections. How-
83 American Judicature Society, Report No. 18, The Extent of Adoption of the Non-Parti-
san, Appointive-Elective Plan for the Selection of Judges, (1969 mimeo).
84 R. WATSON & R. DowNiNG, THE PoLincs OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR 330 (1969).
8 5 Ohio H.J.R. No. 27, 108th General Assembly (1969-70).
8 0 WATSON and DOWNING, supra note 84, at 352.
871 d. at 20-21.
88 Id. at 39.
691d. at 338.
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ever, analysis by type of attorney-respondent reflects the socio-economic
cleavage in the bar: the defendants' lawyers were more likely to evaluate
plan-selected judges as "better," while plaintiffs' attorneys tended to see
no difference in the quality of the judiciary? 0 Watson and Downing
do not assume that the Missouri Plan would operate with identical re-
sults in other states. They suggest that the "cronyistic" conservative na-
ture of the political culture in Missouri would shape any selection process,
while the cleavage in Missouri's organized bar is relevant to this partic-
ular method."-
Although a detailed study has been made of the process by which
organized bar advice is provided in the federal judicial system,92 little
systematic information is available about bar participation in state judicial
politics outside Missouri. As part of this study of Ohio judicial politics,
a small-scale investigation was conducted of the advisory activities of the
bar associations in Ohio's largest metropolitian center. Interviews were
conducted with officials of the Cleveland bar,"3 and data were collected
on lawyer participation in bar polls for endorsement of judicial candi-
dates. Endorsements were analyzed for characteristics of incumbency and
partisan affiliation.
The interest of lawyers in bar polls appears to be relatively low. The
high point of participation in the past decade occurred in 1960, when
48.3 per cent of eligible lawyers returned judicial poll ballots of the Cleve-
land Bar Association. With the exception of a slight increase in 1964,
participation has decreased over the past decade to 35.4 per cent in 1970.
From the one instance of a judicial primary poll, it appears that lawyers,
like the average voter, show less interest in primaries than in the final
selection.94
90 Id. at 345-47.
91M. at 98, 164-65, 336.
9 2 J. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES: THE A.B.A. AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
SELECTION (1965).
93 Interviews were conducted as follows:
Peter Roper, Exec. Dir., Cleveland Bar Assoc., July 20, 1970. Edwin F. Woodle, Past
Pres., Cuyahoga County Bar Assoc., Aug. 7, 1970. John M. Cronquist, Chmn., Bar
Poll Committee, Cuyahoga County Bar Assoc., July 20, 1970. The latter two were
contacted on recommendation of the current president of the Association, Robert
Disbro.
94 TABLE 12
LAwYER PARTICIPATION IN CLEVELAND BAR AssocIATION
JUDICIAL POLLS, 1960-70a
Estimated Per Cent Estimated Per Cent
Year of Ballots Returned Year. of Ballots Returned
1960 48.3% 1968 Prinaryb 32.4%
Election 35.7
1962 45.0
1970 Primaryc ---
1964 45.5 Election 35.4
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By testimony of leaders of both organized associations in Cuyahoga
County, the organizational base for a legal-political sub-system of repre-
sentation of opposing interests appears to exist. The Cleveland Bar As-
sociation is believed to reflect the "defendants' lawyers" syndrome, while
the Cuyahoga County Bar Association is said to represent the "plaintiff
lawyers" constellation of characteristics identified by Watson and Downing
in Missouri. The potentiality for conflict representation is mitigated,
however, by an unknown degree of overlapping membership. This over-
lap in membership may explain the fact that the reputed socio-economic
cleavage in the organized metropolitan bar is not reflected in judicial en-
dorsements. Both groups have tended to endorse incumbents and Re-
publicans.
Although there is no significant difference in the proportion of incum-
bents or Republicans endorsed by the two bar associations, it is interesting
to note that the Cuyahoga County Bar, which reputedly represents the
interests of the less privileged groups in society, endorsed a higher pro-
portion of incumbents and Republicans than its rival, the Cleveland Bar."
Because of the high degree of overlap between Republican and incumbent
judges, it could be argued that the apparent Republican bias in en-
dorsements is simply an inevitable result of the incumbency bias. The
sample of non-incumbents endorsed by either association is too small to
provide conclusive evidence, but Republicans appear to be favored. All
four non-incumbents endorsed by the Cuyahoga County Bar were Repub-
licans; Cleveland Bar endorsements of non-incumbents were divided
4-3, with Republicans in the majority.
Lawyer response to advisory bar polls in one Ohio metropolitan area
appears to resemble voter response to judicial selection not only in rela-
tive lack of interest, but also in preference for Republicans and incum-
bents. The articulation of opposing interests in society has not occurred
a Calculated from estimates provided by Peter P. Roper, Executive Director, in
letter dated Aug. 20, 1970; data furnished in Feb., 1971. Ballots are sent to all mem-
bers of the bar in Cuyahoga County, whether or not they belong to the Association.
Because the ballot is secret, no separate tabulation is made of members' and non-mem-
bers' returns. The Cuyahoga County Bar Association was unable to furnish partici-
pation data.
b First year of endorsements in judicial primaries.
c No appellate judicial contests in the 8th District Court of Appeals or in the Ohio
Supreme Court
05 TABLE 13
INCUMBENCY AND PARTISAN AFILiATION AS VARIABLES IN APPELLATE
JUDICIAL ENDORSEMiENTS BY LOCAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS, 1960-70a
Per cent of Total Endorsements Per cent of Total Endorsements
Organization Incumbents Non-Incumbents Republicans Democrats
Cleveland Bar Assoc. 81.6% 18.4% 68.4% 31.6%
Cuyahoga Co. Bar Assoc. 84.0 16.0 76.0 24.0
a Calculated from endorsements, 1960-70, supplied by Roper, supra note 93; and David Ar-
nold, Sec'y., Cuyahoga County Bar Assn., letter dated Nov. 17, 1970.
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through the organized bar under the present system of selection in Ohio.
However, it is reasonable to predict that institutionalization of lawyer par-
ticipation in the official selection process, as in the Missouri Plan, would
increase the salience of judicial politics for lawyers, and could lead to po-
liticization of the bar.
V. CONCLUSION
This empirical profile of the partisan operation of a nonpartisan elec-
tive system equips us to return to the question posed at the outset: what
selection method best meets the criteria of independence and accountability
in the judiciary?
The nonpartisan elective system fails to meet the criterion of account-
ability in that the lack of a party label deprives the voter of any aggre-
gate information which would enable him to predict the decisional pro-
pensities of a judicial candidate. This deficiency is most serious at the
appellate level, where judicial policy-making is most likely to occur. The
voter tends to be guided by familiarity or identity of the name, which
may depend on incumbency or ethnic affiliation. Upper-status voters are
more likely to have information enabling them to overcome the ano-
nymity of the nonpartisan ballot, and therefore derive an advantage from
its use. Lower-status voters, less capable of coping with the nonpartisan
ballot, are disadvantaged by its use. The "invisibility" of the system
disqualifies it.
The selection plan advocated by the organized bar also fails to meet
the criterion of accountability because of the "invisibility" of the process.
The nominating commission provides for a combination of secrecy and
private group influence which should not be legitimized in the selection
process for public officials. Lawyers may be especially qualified to evalu-
ate judges, but they also have a vested interest in the selection of judges
potentially favorable to their clients. For the organized bar to dominate
or to become a veto group within an official nominating commission is
undesirable and may be improper. The governor, although technically
responsible for judicial appointments under the plan, cannot be held re-
sponsible by the voters for bad appointments, since his responsibility is
shared with an anonymous group of decision-makers. The noncompeti-
tive election for retention of incumbent judges is a meaningless routine,
admittedly built into the plan for the public relations purpose of reducing
voter hostility to adoption of the new method.""
Either partisan election or simple appointment by the governor with
confirmation by the state senate would meet the criterion of accountabil-
ity. Partisan election, creating conditions for maximum responsiveness, is
91 Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure--Its Historical Development,
7 DUQUESNE L. REV. 77 (1968-69).
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less likely than appointment to meet the criterion of independence, since
repeated partisan campaigns may require judicial candidates to play the
game of extractive politics in addition to the larger politics of policy-
making. Gubernatorial appointment provides the "visible" condition un-
der which the voters can hold the judges accountable indirectly through
the appointing agent. At the same time, the judges, through tenure,
can decide cases independently of popular passion or interest group pres-
sures which are sometimes brought to bear on judicial campaigns.
These condusions are, of course, limited by the single-state scope of
the study. Further research should be done in three distinct but related
areas. First, intensive examination of electoral judicial politics in other
states where voters staff the bench would provide further testing ground
for the conclusions drawn here. Secondly, public opinion research should
be undertaken to explore the parameters of voters' response to judges' can-
didacies in states with partisan and nonpartisan ballots. Finally, further
analysis of the decisional output of state appellate courts, carefully con-
trolled for party affiliation of the judges and for the method of judicial
selection,17 would illuminate the relationship hypothesized here between
decisional propensities and visibility of selection method.
07 Nagel's pioneering research in this area did not distinguish between Missouri Plan ap-
pointment and simple executive appointment. He found that appointed judges were more
likely to vote contrary to the expected partisan pattern than elected judges, but his explanatory
hypothesis for this behavior suggested the influence of bipartisan or nonpartisan nominating
commissions in appointive systems. No distinct analysis was made of decisional propensities
of judges appointed by visible and invisible means.
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